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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liability
company,
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)
)
)
)
)
) Docket No. 20010840-CA
) [Argument priority 15]

Plaintiff
vs
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah
body politic and political
subdivision of the State
Of Utah,
Defendant
The Plaintiff-Appellant

B.A.M.

DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.

[hereinafter "B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT] submits the following as
its APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
The Plaintiff-Appellant is B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C,
a Utah limited liability company.
The Defendant-Appellee SALT LAKE COUNTY is a body
politic and political subdivision of the State of Utah,
having

primary

responsibility

to

approve

real

estate

development within its geographic area.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is granted
pursuant to the Order of the Utah Supreme Court "pouring
over" this case to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 78-2a-2(3)(j), Utah Code .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal (and the predicate factual and procedural
situation involving this case) presents the following issues
for review:
1.

That the location-based

not impact-based

roadway dedication and improvement requirements of
Salt Lake County are unconstitutionally excessive
and/or unreasonable, in violation of:
a.

The United States Constitution [the

"Takings Clause" of the Fifth Amendment,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and/or the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] , when
similarly-situated developers created the
essentially-equal "impact" (in the form
of vehicle traffic on 3500 South Street)
but were required, as a condition of
development

approval,

to

make

NO

improvements or dedications; and/or
b.

The Utah Constitution

[Article I,

Section

22: "takings" clause, and/or

Article

I,

Section

24: the

"uniform

operations of laws" provisions].

2.

Whether

or not

the

procedural

applied

the

correct

burdens

of

proof

in

trial

court

properly

standards

adjudicating

the

and
case

involving distinct:
a.

"Federal" law claims; and/or

b.

"State" law claims,

which

have

differing

"burden

of

proof"

requirements for the trial of such claims.
3.

Whether the trial court properly adjudicated

the Plaintiff's "civil rights claim" [42 U.S.C.
§1983]

based

upon

the

foregoing

federal

"constitutional" violations ["the Takings Clause",
Equal Protection, etc.] indisputably implemented
"under

color

requiring

of

the

impact-based

law"

(the

County

location-based
roadway

ordinance,

rather

dedications

than
and

improvements).
4.

Whether the trial court properly ruled by

denying the Plaintiff all economic recovery (for
inverse condemnation, etc., for the uncompensated
"taking") when the County's own witnesses
"appraiser"

an

testified the value of the roadway

"taking" was $15,000.
5.

Whether the trial court erred by failing to

award a "severance damages" recovery based upon
the diminished "lot yield" directly arising from
the

unreasonable

and

excessive

development

improvements of the "taking" effected pursuant to

the County's ordinance.
6.

Whether

the

>

trial

court

erred

in

its

interpretation and application of any "notice of
claim"

requirements,

so

as

to

override

and

preclude adjudication of:
a.

The "federal" constitutional claims;

b.

The "state" law constitutional (i.e.

"self-executing" inverse condemnation)
claims

under Article

I,

Section 24;

and/or
c.

The

"federal"

claims

of

"civil

rights violation" under 42 u.S.C. §1983
and

§1988,

for

which

any

"notice"

requirements are not applicable.
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The interpretation and application of provisions of the
state and national constitutions as well as Utah statute by
the trial court are matters of law. The trial court's
conclusions

of

law

in

civil

cases

are

reviewed

for

correctness. United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme Court 1993);
Society of Separationists, Inc. vs Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339,
1341 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) .
This standard of review has also been referred to as a
"correction of error standard". Jacobsen Investment Company
vs State Tax Commission, 839 P. 2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme
Court 1992);

Sanders vs Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah

Supreme Court 1992). "Correction of error" means that no

particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on
\

questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah
Supreme Court 1994) ; Provo River Water Users' Association vs
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate

<

court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State
vs Deli, 861 P. 2d 431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) ; Howell

<

vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1997 the Plaintiff, as the owner of a 15-acre parcel

i

of undeveloped real estate located at approximately 7700
West 3500 South in the unincorporated area of Salt Lake
County, proposed to develop the parcel into a single-family
residential subdivision known as "Westridge Meadows". The
Plaintiff applied to Salt Lake County

the local government

having development approval over that area
approval

of

the

proposed

subdivision.

for development
The

proposed

subdivision was located immediately south of and adjacent to
3500 South Street

actually a state highway under the

jurisdiction of the Utah Department of Transportation
which had then a pavement half-width of approximately 17
feet and a daily traffic count of approximately "13,000
vehicles per day"
Salt Lake County authorities informed the Plaintiff
that it would be required to improve "3500 South Street" to
an improved half-width of 40 feet, which would have a
traffic count "carrying capacity" to as much as 37,000

,

vehicles per day. The proposed subdivision development would
generate less than 500 "vehicle trips per day". The Countyrequired improvements mandated that the Plaintiff extend the
paved surface, install curb and gutter (to handle stormwater
run-off

from

areas

mostly

outside

development) , install underground

of

the

proposed

stormdrain lines

(to

handle stormwaters from areas mostly outside of the proposed
development) across the entire almost-900' "frontage" of the
development, install sidewalk and passage-preventing (i.e.
no gates) fencing across the almost-900' "frontage" along
3500 South, and to relocate a half-dozen or so existing
electrical power poles and lines (which generally served
other areas outside of the subdivision). Additionally, The
County

required

the

Plaintiff

to

install

the

street

improvements internal to the proposed subdivision, including
those street improvements to the building lots on the
northern boundary thereof. The County required "frontage"
for said lots onto the internal street and effectively
denied

"frontage" onto 3 500 South Street, through the

required, Developer-installed non-passable fencing installed
on the edge of the public right-of-way of 3500 South. The
County also required the developer to dedicate to public use
those areas of the 3500 South Street

which previously had

been held in private ownership to the centerline of the
roadway---so improved, to the 40-foot half-width.
In 1998 Salt Lake County authorities informed the
Plaintiff that its development would be disapproved unless
3500 South Street were improved to a 53-foot "half-width"
5

for the public roadway. The net result of requirement to
develop

3500

South

Street

to

the

53-foot

half-width

effectively took enough real estate that the proposed
"building lot yield" for the subdivision decreased from 46
lots to 44 lots

representing itself approximately $90,300

economic loss to the Plaintiff.
In the spring and early summer of 1998 the Plaintiff
attempted to administratively resolve the matter, by meeting
with County officials and ultimately filing a "notice of
claim"

to

challenge

the

County's

unconstitutionally-

excessive requirements. In July 1998 the Board of County
Commissioner's denied
Plaintiff's

"notice

without granting a hearing---the
of

claim"

unconstitutionally-excessive

challenge
roadway

as

to

the

improvement

requirements for 3 500 South. In August 1998 the instant
litigation was filed.
Notwithstanding the filed litigation, the Plaintiff
pursued its efforts to obtain the development approval of
the proposed subdivision. In August 1999

a year AFTER the

litigation was filed in the district court
County

authorities

finally

approved

the

Salt Lake
subdivision

development, which Plaintiff commenced and has essentially
completed.
In April 2001 the case was tried in a two-day bench
trial before the Honorable Timothy R Hanson of the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County. In June 2001
Judge Hanson

issued his

"Memorandum

Decision",

ruling

entirely in favor of Salt Lake County. Plaintiff's suggested

"findings" were ignored by opposing counsel. The Court
ultimately entered Judgment on 3 0 July 2001. On August 9th
the Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial, which was
effectively resolved by the Court's "Memorandum Decision"
(of 19 September 2001) and/or the attorney-prepared "Order
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Enter Additional Findings",
entered 15 October 2001.
On 18 October 2001 the Plaintiff filed the "notice of
appeal".
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
The Appellant's arguments are summarized as follows:
1.

The District Court erred and misapplied well-

established

case law

[Nollan, Dolan, Banberry

Development] and upheld the COUNTY'S locationbased (as constrasted with an impact-based) system
of requiring

developers

to make the required

dedications and in-kind improvements for roadways
utilized by those developments.
2.

The District Court erred and misapplied the

distinctive and almost opposite procedural burdens
of

proof

pertaining

to

the

"state"

and

the

"federal" constitutional claims, by failing to
require

the

"mathematical

County

to

analysis"

provide
as

to

some

kind

the

of

"rough

proportionality" of the required dedication and
installed improvements, as Dolan requires.
3.

The District Court erred in failing to award

the any damages for the "taking", when in fact the
7

County's

own

witnesses,

without

rebuttal,

acknowledged that the Plaintiff's property had
been taken.
4.

The District Court erred in ruling that the

Plaintiff's submitted "notice of claim" documents
preclude recovery.
ARGUMENT
I -

•'•

THE Location-based "EXACTION AND DEDICATION" REQUIREMENTS
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY VIOLATE STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND PROTECTIONS
AGAINST THE "TAKING" OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
WITHOUT PAYMENT OF "JUST COMPENSATION"
A
IN-KIND "EXACTIONS" AND "IMPACT FEES"
The Plaintiff, as a developer, recognizes the necessity
for exactions and for impact fees: such are necessary to
insure the availability of infrastructure improvements which
make development possible. Similarly, Plaintiff has no
complaint that proper planning and prudence dictate that
public improvements, particularly roadways, be planned for
"growth"

and

increased

usage.

The

Plaintiff's

chief

complaint against the Defendant COUNTY is not with the
"qualitative" issue, but rather with the

"quantitative

issue": namely, that the required in-kind "exactions" are
unconstitutionally excessive and that "just compensation"
should have been (and wasn't but now should be) awarded to
the

Plaintiff

for

such

excessive

dedications

and
i

improvements!
Within the constitutional jurisprudence for "takings"

cases such as this, two methods have been devised by
government
approval

as a pre-condition to granting of development
to

development:

address

the

so-called

"impact"

"impact

created

fees"

and

by

in-kind

"exactions":
"Impact fees" are essentially cash payments
required of a developer, the proceeds of which to
be expended solely on "capital facilities" (as
contrasted with salaries and for operation and
maintenance), for the purposes for which they were
collected. [As adduced by the evidence, SALT LAKE
COUNTY has NO "ROAD IMPACT FEE". The COUNTY does
have "impact fee ordinances" for "parks" and for
"storm sewer

(flood-control)" and does collect

monies from developers

ALL developers

for such

capital projects.] Currently, local government
"impact fees" are regulated by Utah statute. See
Section 11-36-101 et seq, Utah Code, initially
adopted

in 1995 and

applicable

to Salt Lake

County.
In-kind "exactions", on the other hand, are
those

in-kind

improvements

(such

as

roads,

sidewalks, parks, etc.) required to be installed
by the developer as a condition of development
approval. The in-kind "exactions" maybe "on-site"
(i.e.

within

development)

the
or

boundaries
may,

situations, be "off-site".
9

in

of

the

new

new

relatively-rare

(

The Utah state court cases have generally involved
"impact fees". On the other hand, the federal appellate
court decisions

(e.g. Nollan and Dolan) have generally

involved in-kind exactions. Because either method
cash

payment

("impact

fee")

dedication/installation ("exaction")

or

i.e.

in-kind

implicates the same

"constitutional" issue (i.e. "taking or damaging of private
property without just compensation") , the two issues are
for constitutional analysis and jurisprudence purposes
without distinction and are treated equivalently. The Utah
Supreme Court has recognized this equivalency in Banberry,
when the Court

quoting from a New Jersey case

stated:

As with water connection fees, the amount of
such exactions or fees should be such that the
burden of providing these municipal services
"falls equitably upon those who are similarly
situated and in a just proportion to benefits
conferred."

(

631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added.
B

<

IN-KIND EXACTIONS, NOT BASED UPON "IMPACT"
BUT BASED INSTEAD STRICTLY UPON "LOCATION",
CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTAL "TAKING"
During the trial the Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY was
as it had to be

<

surprisingly candid in its admission and

approach to the "core" constitutional issue-at-hand in the
"takings" (as well as the "equal protection" and "uniform

<

operation of law") claims: namely, that ONLY those parcels
which are "highway-abutting" (the phraseology utilized in
Defendant's Memorandum of Law submitted to the District
Court)

are subject

to the in-kind
in

exaction

and that

<

everybody else
not

whether they create the same "impact" or

is exempt from effecting the in-kind dedication. This

"location-based" approach to the "Takings Clause" (which,
herein, refers to the corresponding provisions of Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution) claims is facially
flawed because it not only flies in the face of the
multitude of court decisions to the contrary, but also flies
in the face of the Takings Clause itself and the reasons for
it! The Takings Clause was adopted not merely in the
abstract because the Framers felt that governments had the
tendency

want

in general

"private property"

for some

governmentally-justified "public purpose or use"; rather,
government frequently seemed to want A PARTICULAR PIECE OF
PROPERTY for some "public purpose", such as a road or a park
or a reservoir or military base or whatever. In the real
estate context, IT WAS ALWAYS LOCATION! For "roads", it was--for Takings Clause analysis and application

ALWAYS A

LOCATION ANALYSIS: the government wanted to put the road
"HERE!"

whether that be through a farmer's beet field or

a farmer's residence. It didn't really macter. What did
matter is that the Takings Clause requires the government to
PAY FOR IT!
C
FEDERAL STANDARD AS TO "TAKINGS"
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
cases of Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 107 SCt
3141 (1987) and Dolan vs City of Tigard, 114 SCt 2309 (1994)
11

are THE DEFINITIVE CASES for these "roadway dedication/inkind exaction1' claims.
In Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825,
107 SCt 3141

(1987), the United States Supreme Court

addressed the "constitutional" issue involved in an "in-kind
exaction" such as here at hand. The landowner owned a
beachfront parcel upon which was built a 500-square foot
bungalow that was dilapidated. The landowner desired to
demolish the smaller building and construct a 2500-square
foot residential structure with a two-car garage. His parcel
lay one-quarter mile south of an oceanside public park with
public beach and recreation area. Another public beach was
1800 feet to the south of their parcel. He applied for
permission to erect the larger structure, but was denied
development approval unless he granted to the public a
public access easement across the oceanside end of his
parcel, upon which the public could traverse his property,
in getting from one public park to another. Following state
court decisions favorable to the Coastal Commission, the
propertyowner appealed to the United States Supreme Court
which found the requirement to dedicate the "public access"
easement to violate the United States Constitution. Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, held against the Coastal
Commission's requirement

(for the public easement) and

wrote:
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the
condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something
other than it was. The purpose then becomes, quite
simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some

(

governmental purpose, but without payment of
compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of
"legitimate state interests" in the takings and
land use context, this is not one of them. In
short, unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the
building restriction is not a valid restriction of
land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion.
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. An "out-and-out plan of
extortion"! are pretty strong words for the United States
Supreme Court in characterizing local government actions. As
the "mathematical" applications described herein [in either
the "cost of existing facilities" or the "impact" (defined
in terms of daily traffic-count) context] clearly show, the
"diminimus", almost non-existent "reasonable relationship"
or "nexus" between the "permit condition" (i.e. the required
exaction = dedication and improvement) and the impact
created by the new development is such so as to render the
exaction constitutionally impermissible!
In Nollan the Supreme Court continued:
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to
be more than a pleading requirement, and
compliance with it more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier,
our cases describe the condition for abridgement
of property rights through the police power as a
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State
interest. We are inclined to be particularly
careful about the objective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that
context there is a heightened risk that the
purpose
is avoidance
of
the
compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police power
objective.
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added.
In Nollan

the

Court

REJECTED

the

idea

that

the

governmental permission to develop was a "governmental

benefit" conferred upon the propertyowner. The Court wrote:
But the right to build on one's own property
even though its exercise can be subjected to
legitimate permitting requirements
cannot be
remotely described as a "governmental benefit".
And thus the announcement that the application for
(or granting of) the permit will entail the
yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded
as establishing a voluntary exchange.
Footnote at 107 SCt at 3147. Emphasis added.
In Dolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 114 SCt 2309
(1994), the United States Supreme Court was presented with
the opportunity to revisit Nollan and to articulate "what is
the required degree of connection between the exactions
imposed by the city and the projected

impacts of the

proposed development." 114 SCt at 2312. The propertyowner
operated a hardware store on a 1.6-acre parcel. She desired
to demolish the smaller building and construct a larger
building and to install additional parking facilities. City
ordinances required her to keep at least 15% of the area in
"open space" or landscaping. The city determined, as a
condition of the issuance of the building permit, that she
must also be required to dedicate a public pedestrian or
bicycle path "walkway" in the flood-plain area of a nearby
creek. In holding against the municipality, the Court wrote:
One of the principal purposes of the Takings
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some
people to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness, should be borne by the public as a
whole." (quoting Armstrong vs United States) [114
SCt at 2316. Emphasis added.
Under
the
well-settled
doctrine
of
"unconstitutional conditions", the government may
not require a person to give up a constitutional
right
here
the
right
to
receive
just
compensation when property is taken for public

use
in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the property has
little or no relationship to the benefit.
114 SCt at 2317. Emphasis added.
In attempting to define the "degree of the exactions
demanded by the city's permit conditions bears to the
projected impact of petitioner's proposed development" rii4
SCt at 2318] , the Court was faced with several legal
standards. In describing the various standards and in
adopting

a

"federal

standard"

(for

Takings

Clause)

purposes), the Court wrote:
A number of state courts have taken an
intermediate position, requiring the municipality
to show a "reasonable relationship" between the
required dedication and the impact of the proposed
development. Typical is the Supreme Court of
Nebraska's opinion in Simpson v. North Platte, 206
Neb. 240, 245, 292 N.W.n2d 297, 301 (1980), where
that court stated:
"The distinction, therefore, which must
be made between an appropriate exercise
of the police power and an improper
exercise of eminent domain is whether the
requirement
has
some
reasonable
relationship or nexus to the use to which
the property is being made or is merely
being used as an excuse for taking
property
simply
because
at
that
particular moment the landowner is asking
the city for some license or permit,"
Thus, the court held a city may not require a
property owner to dedicate property for some
future public use as a condition for obtaining a
building permit when such future use is not
"occasioned by the construction sought to be
permitted." Id., at 248, 292 N.W.2d, at 302.
Some form of the reasonable relationship test
has been adopted in many other jurisdictions.
[Citations to cases omitted.] Despite any semantic
differences, general agreement exists among the
courts "that the dedication should have some
reasonable relationship to the needs created by
the [development]." [Citation to authorities
omitted.]

I
We think the "reasonable relationship" test
adopted by a majority of the states courts is
closer to the federal constitutional norm than
either of those previously discussed. But we do
not adopt it as such, partly because the term
"reasonable
relationship"
seems
confusingly
similar to the term "rational basis" which
describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
We
think
a
term
such
as
"rough
proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to
be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No
precise mathematical calculation is required, but
the city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development.
114 SCt at 2319-2320. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and
other authorities

cited in original Supreme Court text

have been omitted.] The COUNTY'S requirement

that the

Plaintiff install improvements which are in excess of the
needed improvements projected for more than twenty years
into the future is certainly constitutionally suspect!
With respect to the "rough proportionality" required to
be derived and shown (in a burden-of-proof context) by the
government, the Dolan court wrote:
No precise mathematical calculation is
required, but the city must make some effort to
quantify its findings in support of the dedication
for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the
conclusory statement that it could offset some of
the traffic demand generated. . . . The city's
goal of reducing flooding hazards and traffic
congestion, and providing for public greenways,
are laudable, but there are outer limits to how
this may be done. "A strong public desire to
improve the public condition [will not] warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change,"
114 SCt at 2322. Emphasis added. Citation to cases omitted.
As early as 198 0 the United States Supreme Court had

{

(

<

written:
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may
not transform private property into public
property without compensation, even for the
limited duration of the deposit in court. This is
the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That
Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary
use of governmental power,
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Incorporated vs Beckwith, 449 US
155 at 164, 101 SCt 446 at 452 (1980). Emphasis added.
Although the Plaintiff DEMANDED, as early as April
1998, that the COUNTY create and/or provide a copy of the
written "individualized determination" as to the needs
created by the Westridge Meadows development and the "rough
proportionality",
"constitutional"
Pullos'

the
per

COUNTY
Dolan

failed

requirement.

in

this

The

Andrea

"individualized determination" is not what the

Supreme Court requires; Ms Pullos' calculations are merely
the self-serving recitation of issues purporting to explain
the County's perceived needs

over time and based upon very

generalized projections some of which were 22 years "out"
(i.e. into the future)!
The Defendant intentionally chose to distract the trial
court

and

distraction

the
from

District
the

Court

succumbed

jurisprudential

to

that

significance

of

Nollan and Dolan by not only addressing directly their
application, but by citing to OLDER, federal cases which
have nothing to do with the issues at hand. To the extent
that Nollan and Dolan are directly on point

i.e. they

involve "takings" of real estate, for "public us."
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they

overrule those earlier cases, implicitly or expressly. And
to the extent that the Dolan EXPRESSLY REJECTS much of the
former case law analysis cited and relied upon (in the
abstract) by the Defendant in its Memorandum of Law.
The

Defendant

argued

and

the

District

Ccurt

erroneously agreed---that Nollan and Dolan cases do not
apply to "roadways" and so they simply don't apply to the
case at hand! WRONG! ABSOLUTELY WRONG! Roadways
be 3 500 South or any other public roadway

whether it

are not unique

in the "constitutional" sense! What Nollan and Dolan are
talking about is a CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE: that government
MAY

NOT

condition

development

approval

upon

the

uncompensated "taking" of private property for public use,
unless the

"taking" correlates to the impact actually

created!
Nolan is NOT merely about some beachfront property and
the beautiful views which might be enjoyed by members of the
public as they saunter across a former privately-owned
beach! Dolan is NOT merely about some little jogging path
adjacent to a creek, which sometimes overflowed during the
rainy season. Nollan and Dolan are about CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES which have direct application, FACTUALLY AND
LEGALLY, to the issues at bar. Nollan would not have a
different analysis or result had the California requirement
been phrased "all ocean-abutting properties shall dedicate
an easement". Dolan would not have had a different analysis
or result that the City's requirement been phrased "all
Fanno Creek-abutting properties shall dedicate an easement
ift

. . . » . Nollan and Dolan are THE DEFINITIVE AND DISPOSITIVE
FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS and the principles therein must be
applied in the case at bar.
In

essence,

situation

which

literally,
the

United

this

case

States

illuminates

Supreme

Court

a
has

characterized as the
"heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of
the compensation requirement fof the Takings
Clause!, rather than the stated police power
objective.
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. Bracketed material added
for clarity.
D
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF "REASONABLENESS"
UNDER UTAH STATE LAW
In 1981

almost two decades ago

the Utah Supreme

Court was presented with the case of Banberry Development
Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah Supreme
Court 1981). In Banberry a real estate developer challenged
South Jordan City's required parks and cu]inary water
connection "impact fees" and "exactions". In resolving the
legal issue and going to great lengths to establish landmark
precedence

certainly for Utah

the Utah Supreme Court

wrote:
The Home Builders case established the
principle upon which the reasonableness of the
water connection fee in this case should be
judged. The "fair contribution" of the connecting
party should not exceed "the expense thereof met
by others." Or, as the New Jersey Supreme Court
held in a subsequent case, the rules governing the
allocation of improvement costs between city and
developer would ideally have been such as to
insure, to the greatest extent practicable, that
the cost of extending a municipal water facility
1Q

i
would fall equitably upon those who are similarly
situated and in a just proportion to benefits
conferred. They should be sufficiently flexible
to permit consideration to be given to the facts
and circumstances of each particular case.
Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E.
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505 (1972).
Therefore, where the fee charged a new subdivision
or a new property hookup exceeds the direct costs
incident thereto (as a means of sharing the costs
of common facilities), the excess must survive
measure against the standard that the total costs
"fall equitably upon those who are similarlysituated and in a just proportion to benefits
conferred." Stated otherwise, to comply with the
standard of reasonableness, a municipal fee
related to services like water and sewer must not
require newly developed properties to bear more
than their equitable share of the capital costs in
relation to benefits conferred.
To determine the equitable share of the
capital costs to be borne by newly developed
properties, a municipality should determine the
relative burdens previously borne and yet to be
borne by those properties in comparison with the
other properties in the municipality as a whole;
the fee in question should not exceed the amount
sufficient to equalize the relative burdens of
newly developed and other properties.
631 P. 2d at

. Emphasis added. The Utah Supreme Court

continued, by identifying seven criteria to be evaluated to
determine the "relative burden already borne and yet to be
borne" by the newly-developed properties. The Court wrote:
Among the most important factors the municipality
should consider in determining the relative burden
already borne and yet to be borne by newly
developed properties and other properties are the
following, suggested by the well reasoned
authorities cited below:
(1) the cost
facilities;

of

existing

capital

(2) the manner of financing existing
capital facilities (such as user charges,
special assessments, bonded indebtedness,
general taxes, or federal grants);

(3) the relative extent to which the
newly developed properties and the other
properties
in the municipality
have
already contributed
to the cost
of
existing capital facilities
(by such
means
as
user
charges,
special
assessments, or payment from the proceeds
of general taxes);
(4) the relative extent to which the
newly developed properties and the other
properties
in the municipality
will
contribute
to the cost of
existing
capital facilities in the future;
(5) the extent
to which
the newly
developed properties are entitled to a
credit
because
the
municipality
is
requiring their developers or owners (by
contractual arrangement or otherwise) to
provide common facilities
(inside or
outside the proposed development) that
have been provided by the municipality
and financed through general taxation or
other means (apart from user charges) in
other parts of the municipality;
(6) extraordinary costs, if any, in
servicing the newly developed properties;
and
(7) the time-price differential inherent
in fair comparisons of amounts paid at
different times.
631 P. 2d at 903-904. Emphasis added. Citation to supporting
cases omitted. Criteria #4 and #5

the relative extent to

which the "new" development is adding to the value of the
existing facilities

is directly pertinent to the situation

at bar.
The Utah Supreme Court continued:
In adjudicating the validity of any
individual
application
of
this
standard
of
reasonableness,
the
courts
must
concede
municipalities the flexibility necessary to deal
realistically with questions not susceptible of
exact measurement. Precise mathematical equality
"is neither feasible nor constitutionally vital."
Airwick Industries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage
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Authority, supra, 270 A. 2d at 26.
Similarly,
municipal officials must also have the legal power
to deal
creatively
with
extraordinary
or
unforeseen circumstances in the provision of
municipal services. Rose v. Plymouth Town, 110
Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946).
. We agree with and adopt the New Jersey
court's ruling in Deerfield Estates, Inc. v.
Township of E. Brunswick, supra, 286 A. 2d at
507-508:
The rule we lay down must be given a
pragmatic application. Complete equality
of treatment may sometimes be impossible,
especially where a municipality has
followed no set pattern with respect to
past
extensions..
Nor
should
a
municipality be denied the right to
modify an established pattern where
altered circumstances reasonably so
dictate. Equality of treatment may upon
occasion be forced to give way before
some supervening public interest. But
insofar as such equality can reasonably
be achieved this must be done,
631 P. 2d at 904. Emphasis added. It is obvious that the Utah
Supreme

Court

intends

creating the "impact"

that

everyone

that

is, those

should pay, "equally" if possible

but "almost equally as possible", in any regard!
The Utah Supreme Court continued:
Reasonableness
obviously
holds
the
municipality to a higher standard of rationality
than the requirement that its actions not be
arbitrary or capricious.
Under the reasonableness test in Call v. City
of West Jordan, supra, the benefits derived from
the exaction need not accrue solely to the
subdivision (614 P.2d at 1259); flood control and
recreation are needs that cannot be treated in
isolation from the rest of the municipality. At
the same time, the benefits derived from the
exaction must be of "demonstrable benefit" to the
subdivision (Id. at 1259).
As with water connection fees, the amount of
such exactions or fees should be such that the
burden of providing these municipal services
"falls equitably upon those who are similarly
situated and in a just proportion to benefits
no

conferred." Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of
E. Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505
(1971). The measurement of "benefits conferred"
may have a more significant impact on the
reasonableness of park fees than on water
connection fees.
The central facilities that
support water and sewer service would generally
confer the same benefits in every part of the
municipality, but the benefits conferred by
recreational, flood control, or other dispersed
resources may be measurably different in different
parts of the municipality. Park improvement fees
should therefore be fixed so as to be equitable in
light of the relative benefits conferred on, as
well as the relative burdens previously borne and
yet to be borne by, the newly developed properties
in comparison with the other properties in the
municipality as a whole. The fees in question
should not exceed the amount sufficient to
equalize the relative benefits and burdens of
newly developed and other properties.
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added. Public roadways, like
"parks", are "dispersed resources". In fact, roadways are
the most "dispersed", governmentally-owned resources of all.
Thus, per Banberry, the exactions required of a developer
for roadways should be
"equitable in light of the relative benefits
conferred on, as well as the relative burdens
borne and yet to be borne by, the newly developed
properties in comparison with the other properties
in the municipality as a whole.
Id. Emphasis added.
In Call vs City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P. 2d 217
(Utah Supreme

Court

1979)

[hereinafter

"Call

I"], on

rehearing 614 P.2d 1259 (1980) [hereinafter "Call II"],
reversed on other grounds 727 P.2d 180 (1986), the Utah
defined

and

established

the Utah

standard

as

to the

constitutional validity of "impact fees" (and, implicitly,
"in-kind exactions") , to be one of "reasonable relationship"
(that is, there must be a reasonable relationship between

the needs created by the development and the impact fee (or
in-kind exaction) required of the developer.
The COUNTY is similarly prohibited from utilizing the
"in-kind

exaction"

to

cure

pre-existing

deficiencies.

[Raising the "service level" of the 3 500 South roadway from
its present (1997) "service level D (approaching gridlock)"
to "service level B (almost free-flowing)" is, in essence,
"curing

the

pre-existing

unconstitutionally

deficiency"

imposed upon

the back

nevertheless
of

a single

developer, the Plaintiff!
That government should pay for the additional property
so

acquired

(from

the

existing

1997

paved

roadway

extending 17 feet to the lip of the asphalt paving) is
mandated by a long line of Utah judicial decisions. See, for
example, Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1
vs Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P. 2d 1376 (Utah Supreme Court
1987) [holding that the government must condemn and pay for
those portions of the intended roadway which are outside of
that portion of the roadway which might be claimed to be
public from previous usage].
E
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO "SEVERANCE DAMAGES"
EQUAL TO THE DIFFERENCE IN "LOT YIELD"
WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN REALIZED IN THE DEVELOPMENT
BUT FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND EXCESSIVE "TAKING"
The

District

Court's

misapplication

of

the

"constitutional" issues at hand seemingly caused it to
ignore the Plaintiff's claims for "severance damages", based
upon the "loss" (i.e. differential) in "lot yield" which

could have been realized, but for the unconstitutional and
excessive "taking". [See TRANSCRIPT at pp. 132-133.]
Numerous

other

judicial

decisions

support

the

propertyowner's entitlement to compensation for "takings",
including "severance damages". See Farmers New World Ins vs
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990); Colman vs Utah
State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Hamblin vs
Clearfield City, 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990); Carpet Barn vs
State of Utah, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah Ct App 1990); Hansen vs
Salt Lake County, 794 P. 2d 838 (Utah 1990) ; and Three-D Corp
vs Salt Lake City, 752 P. 2d 1321 (Utah Ct App 1988) . In the
instant case, the coerced dedication

(from the 33-foot

"half-width" line to the increased 53-foot "half-width"
line)

measured

against

the

almost

900-foot

northern

"frontage" of the Westridge Meadows subdivision, constitutes
almost 18,000 square feet of additional area. Had this area
been able to be utilized within the subdivision for "lots",
TWO ADDITIONAL BUILDING LOTS could have been created. [The
average "make-up" quantity derived from reconfiguring the
first 44 lots was a mere 44 square feet (2,000 square feet
divided by 44 lots). Thus, the coerced "dedication" to the
53-foot line has "severance damages" against the remaining
parcel of approximately $90,000: $45,000 for each of two
"lots" which could have been created and sold, but for the
coerced dedication.
The instant situation must also be distinguished from
the "shopping center development", in which the developer
might willingly install the widened roadway improvements, if

only to increase and enhance the commercial potential of the
larger number of vehicles driving past. In the instant
"residential" development context, the Plaintiff's interests
are the exact opposite: residences want privacy and quiet.
Also distinguishing is the fact that THE COUNTY ALSO MADE
THE DEVELOPER INSTALL AN ADDITIONAL ACCESS STREET FOR THOSE
HOMES "BACKING" ONTO 3 500 SOUTH: not only has the Developer
been required to improve the 53 feet of "half-width" of 3500
South, but has ALSO BEEN REQUIRED to dedicate and install an
additional 33-feet of "half-width"

(i.e. pavement, curb

gutter, sidewalk) on the north side of the "internal" (i.e.
subdivision) street!
In the instant situation, the Defendant COUNTY has
singled out the "highway-abutting" propertyowners and made
them pay 100% of the roadway improvement costs (of 3 500
South), whereas those "other properties" (such as "Elusive
Meadows", a similarly-situated single-family residential
development immediately south of Westridge Meadows and
utilizing the very Montclair Drive to gain access onto 3500
South) PAY NOTHING! Banberry requires:
The fees in question should not exceed the amount
sufficient to equalize the relative benefits and
burdens of newly developed and other properties.
631 P. 2d at 905. Emphasis added. That the Plaintiff paid for
EVERYTHING in the dedication and improvement of 3 50 0 South
Street is simply NOT "EQUITABLE".

II '
PERTINENT STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERMINE
THE COUNTY7S REQUIRED DEDICATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS
Without

digressing

from

the

Plaintiff's

"constitutional" claims, two Utah statutes have implications
within this case: if only to negate the COUNTY'S claimed
reliance on any kind of "legal" justification.
A
THE UTAH IMPACT FEES ACT
The Utah Impact Fees Act, codified at Section 11-36101, Utah Code, was first adopted in 1995 and is applicable
against the COUNTY. Section 11-36-102(13)(a) authorizes the
imposition and collection of a "roadway impact fee". Yet the
COUNTY

has

"equalize"

done
the

nothing.

Rather

"relative burden"

than

attempting

to

(per Banberry) which

everyone pays, the COUNTY persists in its "highway-abutting"
approach in which a few PAY EVERYTHING and most PAY NOTHING!
The Impact Fees Act which further undermines the
COUNTY'S position. Subsection 11-36-102(13) (c) effectively
precludes, by "definition", the County from calculating,
assessing and collecting a "road impact fee" which includes
"state and federal highways" as part of the derivation or
justification for any "road impact fee". Thus, the COUNTY is
effectively precluded from utilizing ANY road impact fees
for the improvement of "state or federal highways". This
preclusion indicates a clear legislative intent: that the
improvement

of

State

Highways

will

be

the

singular

responsibility of the State and UDOT, utilizing general

State revenues!
B

PRIVATE PROPERTY PROTECTION ACT
In 1994 the Utah Legislature, ostensibly in response to
the growing trend towards the increasing

frequency of

"Takings Clause" incidents and the successful litigation of
such claims

e.g. Nollan (1987), First English Evangelical

Lutheran Church of Glendale vs Los Angeles County, 4 82 US
304, 107 SCt 2378 (1987) [holding county may be liable for
"taking" effected pursuant to temporary building moratorium
imposed for public safety purpose] and Lucas vs South
Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 US 1003, 112 SCt 286 (1992)
[concerning

"regulatory taking"]

adopted the "Private

Property Protection Act", codified at 63-90-1 et seq, Utah
Code.
The

Plaintiff

concedes

that

the

Private

Property

Protection Act is not, per se, according to its terms,
directly applicable to or binding upon Defendant COUNTY in
this case. The provisions of the Act are nevertheless
illuminating and helpful, for at least two reasons:
1.

The Court must remember that 3 5 00 South is a

State

Road,

that

UDOT

was

the

"ultimate

beneficiary" of any uncompensated dedications or
exactions

the

COUNTY

could

unconstitutionally) , and
actually

"doing

require

that

UDOT's

the

(albeit

COUNTY

bidding",

was

albeit

indirectly.
2.

The

legislation

clearly

indicates

a

legislative

recognition

of

the

"constitutional

takings" issues which, particularly since Nollan
was announced in 1987, have been in the forefront
of "constitutional law", particularly at the state
and local level.
Section 63-90-2, under "definitions" of the Act, states in
relevant part:
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Constitutional taking" or "taking" means due
to a government action private property is taken
such that compensation to the owner of the
property is required by either:
(a) The Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States; or
(b) Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution.
(2)

(a)

"Governmental action" or "action" means:

(i) proposed rules and emergency rules
by a state agency that if adopted and
enforced may limit the use of private
property unless its provisions are in
accordance with applicable state or
federal statutes;
(ii)
proposed
or
implemented
licensing
or permitting
conditions,
requirements, or limitations to the use
of private property unless its provisions
are in accordance with applicable state
or
federal
statutes,
rules,
or
regulations;
(iii)
required
dedications
or
exactions
from
owners
of
private
property; or
(iv)

statutes and rules.

(3) "Private property" means any school or
institutional trust lands and any real or pers ,nal
property in this state that is protected by either
S>Q

the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
of
the
Constitution of the United States or Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.

Emphasis added.
Section 63-90-3, Utah Code, indicates a legislative
sensitivity to direct that state agencies keep abreast of
definitive

court

rulings

on

the

"takings"

issues,

by

providing:
63-90-3. State agencies to adopt guidelines.
(1) Each state agency shall adopt guidelines to
assist them in the identification of actions that
have constitutional taking implications.
(2) In creating the guidelines, the state agency
shall take into consideration recent court rulings
on the taking of private property.
(3) The state agency shall complete the guidelines
on or before January 1, 1994, and review and
update the guidelines annually
to maintain
consistency with court rulings.
Emphasis added. The "rubber hits the road" literally in
Section 63-90-4, which provides in relevant part:
63-90-4.

Agency actions.

(1) Using the guidelines prepared under Section
63-90-3, each state agency shall:
(a) determine whether an action has
constitutional taking implications; and
(b) prepare
an
assessment
of
constitutional taking implications that
include an analysis of the following:
(i) the likelihood that the
action
may
result
in
a
constitutional
taking,
including a description of how
the taking effects the use or
value of private property;
(ii)
alternatives to
proposed action that may:

the

(A) f u l f i l l
the
government's
legal
obligations
of
the
state agency;
(B) reduce the impact
on
the
private
property owner; and
(C) reduce the risk
of a constitutional
taking; and
(iii)
an
estimate
of
financial cost to the state for
compensation and the source of
payment within the agency's
budget
if a
constitutional
taking is determined.
(2) In addition
to the
guidelines
prepared under Section 63-90-3, each
state agency shall adhere, to the extent
permitted by law, to the following
criteria if implementing or enforcing
actions that have constitutional taking
implications:

(a) If
an
agency
action
requires a person to obtain a
permit for a specific use of
private
property,
any
conditions imposed on issuing
the
permit
shall
directly
relate to the purpose for which
the permit is issued and shall
substantially
advance
that
purpose.
(b) Any restriction imposed on
the use of private property
shall be proportionate to the
extent the use contributes to
the overall problem that the
restriction is to redress.
(c) If an action involves a
permitting process or any other
decision-making process that
will
interfere
with,
or
otherwise prohibit, the use or
private property pending the
completion of the process, the
duration of the process shall
be
kept
to
the
minimum

necessary*

Emphasis added.

Under Section 63-90-4(2) (a), were UDOT to

have been directly involved, the "permitting condition"
(i.e. dedication and/or improvement of the 53-foot "halfwidth") would been required to "directly relate" to the
purpose (i.e. increased carrying capacity of the roadway)
and would also have to "substantially advance" that purpose.
[Obviously, the Legislature was reading and attempting to
comply with Nollan.]
Under
imposed

Subsection

on

the

use

63-90-4 (2) (b) ,
of

private

the

"restriction

property

shall

be

proportionate to the extent the use contributes to the
overall problem that the restriction is to redress". Thus,
the restriction (i.e. the dedication and/or development of
the increased right-of-way of the 350u South Street roadway)
must be "proportionate to the extent the use
Westridge

Meadows

subdivision

development:

[i.e. the
44

homes]

contributes to the overall problem (i.e. 3500 South traffic
usage)". Emphasis added.
The

foregoing

provisions

indicate

a

legislative

appreciation of the "takings" issue and an attempt to avoid
the problem, if at all possible. Obviously, UDOT
state agency

as a

is not able to as insensitive or indulgent

(unconstitutional is a better term) than the Defendant
COUNTY has been. Rather than even recognize and deal with
the constitutional ramifications of Banberry, Nollan and

Dolan, the COUNTY has chosen to ignore those cases
administratively

and

legislatively

in

the

past

and

judicially in the context of the instant litigation

and

persist in the "location-based" exactions, unrelated to any
"impact" or lack thereof.
The Defendant COUNTY, having been told multiple times
before the "taking" was actually effected, has arbitrarily
and intentionally chosen to drive forward, full-steam ahead,
in a winner-take-all

fashion, devoid

of any apparent

sensitivity of the legislative intent and restrictions
pertinent to improving state roadways.
When coupled with the provisions of the Protection of
Private Property Act [i.e. the required dedications, if any,
are to be "proportionate to the extent the use contributes
to the overall problem"], the two statutes clearly indicates
a legislative intention that the citizens at large, through
UDOT,

the

eminent

domain

process

available

to

UDOT

(including the payment of just compensation) , and/or regular
state tax revenues are to be utilized to acquire and
development State Highway improvements. Placing the entire
burden upon the back of the "highway-abutting" landowner is
clearly contrary to statutory provisions applicable to this
State Highway.
Ill
BURDEN OF PROOF PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Under the state law claims, the developer has the
burden

of proving

standard

of

a violation

reasonableness"

of

the

(i.e. that

"constitutional
there

was

no

"reasonable
required

relationship" between

and

the

needs

(or

the exaction or fee

impact)

created

by

the

development), per Banberry, supra, ["Once (disclosure of the
information used to calculate the impact fees) is done, the
burden of showing failure to comply with the constitutional
standard

of

reasonableness

in this matter

is on the

challengers." Emphasis added. Parenthesized material added
for clarity.]
However, for the federal claims, the burden of showing
the "rough proportionality" (discussed below) between the
imposed in-kind exaction and the impact created is upon the
governmental entity. See Dolan vs City of Tigard, below. 114
SCt at 2320, Footnote #8. Dollan requires the COUNTY to make
. some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.
114 SCt at 2319-2320. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and
other authorities

cited in original Supreme Court text

have been omitted.] The calculations previously provided to
the

Plaintiff

discovery

in

January

and testified

2001,

only

as

to by the COUNTY'S

pre-trial
engineer

[TRANSCRIPT at pp. 174-175] are not the "individualized
determination" contemplated by Dolan. The Plaintiff believes
the Plaintiff should prevail on both state and federal
claims: the Plaintiff has established a violation of the
"constitutional standard of reasonableness" on the state
claims and that the County has failed in its burden of
proving

the

"rough

proportionality"

(admittedly

the

equivalent

of

the

"reasonable

relationship"

standard

followed, for the most part, by the state courts) on the
federal claims. The Plaintiff further believes it proved
implicitly the "federal" unconstitutionality of the COUNTY'S
"location-based"
recognized

as

distinguished

"impact-based"

method

from
of

the

imposing

legallyin-kind

exactions for "road" purposes!
VI
"EQUAL PROTECTION" AND "UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS"
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND PROTECTIONS ARE VIOLATED
BY THE COUNTY'S LOCATION-BASED "EXACTIONS" REQUIREMENTS
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides, in relevant part:

*-

[Section 1] . . . nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Emphasis added.
Article
provides:

I,

Section

24, of

tne Utah

Constitution

"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation."
Emphasis added.
In Liedtke vs Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982) . the
Utah Supreme Court stated that Article I, §24 is "generally
considered the equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution." 649 P.2d at 81 n.l.
Although their language is dissimilar, Article I, §24 and
the

Equal

Protection

Clause

embody

the

same

general

principle: persons similarly situated should be treated
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not

be treated as if their circumstances were the same. See
Baker vs Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979); McLaughlin vs
Florida, 379 US 184 (1964) .
In Malan vs Lewis, 6 93 P. 2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court
1984) , the Utah

Supreme

"automobile guest statute"

Court

invalidating

the Utah

illuminated and articulated the

purposes and application of the "uniform operation of laws"
and the "equal protection" provisions of the constitutions.
The Court wrote:
Whether a statute meets equal protection
standards depends in the first instance upon the
objectives of the statute and whether the
classifications established provide a reasonable
basis for promoting those objectives.

Article 1, §24 protects against two types of
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to
all persons within a class.
Second, the
statutory classifications and the different
treatment given the classes must be based on
differences that have a reasonable tendency to
further the objectives of the statute. If the
relationship of the classification
to the
statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful,
the discrimination is unreasonable.
Equal
protection of the law, both state and federal,
"requires
more
of
a
state
law
than
nondiscriminatory application within the class it
establishes . " The classification must rest upon
some difference which "'bears a reasonable and
just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed, and can never be made
arbitrarily and without any such basis . . . .
[A]rbitrary selection can never be justified by
calling it classification."
"The Courts must
reach and determine the question whether the
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable
in light of its purpose. The law under Article I,
§24 is not different.
693 P.2d at 670-72. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and
footnotes omitted.

The claimed "legislative classification"

i.e. that

Plaintiff, by reason of its ownership and development of the
parcel immediately adjacent to the 3500 South Street public
roadway, must dedicate and improve the same to the full 53foot half-width while a similarly-situated

subdivision

development having the same "impact" does not have to effect
such dedication or incur such costs

violates the Malan vs

Lewis "equal protection" and "uniform operation of laws"
principles, as follows:
1.

the required dedication/improvement DOES NOT

"provide a reasonable basis for promoting those
objectives";
2.

the required dedication/improvement IS NOT

"based on differences

that have a reasonable

tendency to further the objectives of the statute
. . ."/ AND
3.

the required dedication/improvement DOES NOT

"[bear] a reasonable and just relation to the act
in

respect

to

which

the

classification

is

proposed. . ."
See Malan vs Lewis, supra.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
For a law to be constitutional under Article I,
section 24, it is not enough that it be uniform on
its face. What is critical is that the operation
of the law be uniform. A law does not operate
uniformly if "persons similarly situated are not
"treated similarly" or if "persons in different
circumstances"
are
"treated
as
if
their
circumstances were the same."
Malan vs Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 at 669 (Utah 1984). Emphasis

added.
Malan vs Lewis, supra, held that Article I, Section 24
requires that a law must apply equally to all persons within
a class and that statutory classifications must have a
"reasonable

tendency

to further the objectives of the

statute," 693 P.2d at

670. In the instant situation, the

only "objective" which can be advanced in furtherance of the
COUNTY'S policy of requiring the coerced "dedication" and
improvement to the 53-foot half-width is to AVOID THE
PAYMENT

OF

THE

"JUST

COMPENSATION"

REQUIRED

BY

THE

CONSTITUTIONS!
The required dedication/improvement, required from the
Plaintiff

when

the

similarly-situated,

"side-by-side"

developer of "Elusive Meadows" immediately to the south PAYS
NOTHING, is not the "uniform operation" the constitution
requires!

The

"abutting-highway"

criterion

for

the

"classification" is a blatant, straight-forward attempt to
avoid

the

constitution

requirement

of paying

for the

"taking"!
In State Tax Commission vs Department of Finance, the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
Equal
protection
protects
against
discrimination within a class. The legislature has
considerable discretion in the designation of
classifications but the court must determine
whether such classifications operate equally on
all persons similarly situated.
Thus, whether a classification operates
uniformly
on all persons
situated
within
constitutional parameters is an issue that must
ultimately be decided by the judiciary.
576 P.2d 1297 at 1298 (Utah 1978). Emphasis added.

In Leetham vs McGinn, 524 P.2d 323 (Utah 1974), the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
A legislative classification is never arbitrary or
. unreasonable
so
long
as
the
basis
for
differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the
purposes or objectives to be accomplished by the
act. If some persons or transactions, excluded
from the operation of the law, were its to the
subject matter of the law in no differentiable
class from those included within its operation,
the law is discriminatory in the sense of being
arbitrary and unconstitutional.
542 P. 2d at

. Emphasis added. Citation to footnotes

omitted.
The Defendant COUNTY would have the Court believe there
is

no

"equal

protection"

and/or

"uniform

operation"

violation because the "highway-abutting" approach treats all
"similarly-situated" propertyowners the same: all "highwayabutting"

property

owners

must

effect

the

required

dedications and make the required improvements and all other
(i.e. non-"highway-abutting") propertyowners don't have to
do anything! It's that simple! WRONG! WRONG ANALYSIS! WRONG
RESULT! WRONG! WRONG! WRONG! The Constitutions require that
similarly-situated persons (in this case, propertyowners at
large) be treated "equally" and "uniformly"! EVERYONE OUGHT
TO BE REQUIRED TO CONTRIBUTE AN "EQUITABLE SHARE" TO THE
COSTS OF THE ROADWAYS WHICH EVERYONE USES. A single group,

regardless of how creatively or carefully defined (i.e.
"highway-abutting"),

of

propertyowners

cannot

be

unconstitutionally coerced to provide 100% of the costs of
the

roadway

improvements,

merely

by

reason

"coincidence of geography". If such were the case
39

of

the

namely,

that Government by administrative or legislative fiat (the
so-called ipse dixit)

could avoid the "payment of just

compensation" of the Takings Clause, why don't we just give
Government

a bunch of maps and marking pens and the

Government can "have at it"? They can draw whatever lines
(at whatever "half-width") they choose. If the COUNTY'S
"location based" requirement were taken to the extreme, the
developer of a single parcel could be required to not only
install the wider roadway improvements, but might be called
upon to dedicate (and improve???) land for a public park, a
fire station, a sewage treatment plant, and so forth and so
forth. The list is conceptually endless! The development of
a single-family residence could, conceivable, result in the
coerced dedication of acres and acres of real estate, "for
public use", but with any "reasonable relationship or nexus"
between the required dedication and the actual IMPACT
created by the development.
In the instant case, there are but TWO CLASSIFICATION
GROUPS: those "highway-abutting" parcels forced to bear 100%
and those parcels which do not abut a highway (and are thus
entitled to pay NOTHING), EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY CREATE THE
SAME IMPACT!

The

residents

of

the

Elusive

Meadows

subdivision

immediately to the south of Westridge Meadows DO NOT merely
hop in their car, drive down Montclair Drive almost to 3500
South, AND THEN TURN AROUND AND GO HOME AND PARK IN THE
GARAGE. Those "Elusive Meadows" residents DO UTILIZE 3500
South, for which they have paid nothing! Then why do the

Elusive Meadows people PAY NOTHING and the Westridge Meadows
PAY EVERYTHING?
The COUNTY argued
District

Court

to the District

apparently

accepted

that

Court

and the

the

COUNTY'S

"classification" (of "highway-abutting" parcels versus other
parcels) is reasonable and that the "landowner voluntarily
placed himself into the 'classification' by choosing to
purchase such a parcel." That reasoning is absolutely
flawed, for at least two reasons:
First, the County's argument stands in direct
contradiction to the constitutional principles
involved in the Takings Clause analysis, as per
Dolan and Nollan and related cases.
Second,

the County's

stated

reasoning is

flawed because it assumes the developer
instant plaintiff

the

is necessarily the owner who

will be adversely impact by the COUNTY'S policy of
not paying for the roadways. Before there was the
Plaintiff as a developer there was a propertyowner
of the very parcel of real estate later developed
as

the

"Westridge

Meadows

subdivision" . That

propertyowner had rights, as a propertyowner! No
matter how far back in time one goes

as far back

as necessary, but certainly only to 1986 when the
Utah Constitution, with Article I, Section 24, was
adopted

one can always go back further in time

than the County can go back to its required "ipse
dixit" decree that the 3500 South roadway right41

of-way "half-width" is "33 feet" OR ""40 feet" or
"53 feet" or whatever!
The

COUNTY'S

unconstitutional

"decree"

for

the now-

understood purpose of avoiding the very constitutional
payment of "just compensation" required by the Constitution--affects

the

rights

of

that

primal

landowner:

that

landowner simply had no choice. He (or she) already owned
the real estate, BEFORE the COUNTY'S "decree". That "decree"
obviously impacts the value of the owner's property, because
it effectively diminishes the selling price of the real
estate, because a potential developer will pay less because
the potential developer

like the Plaintiff

will have to

pay for the improvements! It is for the PROTECTION OF THE
OWNER OF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY that the Taking Clause was
written and applied! The COUNTY cannot claim that the Equal
Protection argument is misguided. This is not a situation
where the Plaintiff has "voluntarily placed himself" into
the "classification"; this is a situation where the COUNTY
has

chosen

to

ignore

clearly-defined

constitutional

principles!
VII
PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983
IS WELL-PROVED AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY ANY
UTAH STATUTORY "NOTICE" REQUIREMENTS OR RESTRICTIONS
That

the

COUNTY'S

"exactions"

(dedication

and

improvement) requirement is pursuant to ordinance is a
"given", well-proved (even admitted) in the trial!
Following the Civil War, Congress adopted the "Civil
Rights Act", presently codified at 42 U.S.C. §1983, which
A?

presently provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of
the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceedings for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
Emphasis added.
The "Takings Clause" analysis and application
Nollan and Dolan, discussed above

per

are clearly applicable

to the case at bar. The federal

"Takings Clause" is

applicable against the Defendant COUNTY by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Chicago, B. & Q. Railway Company vs Chicago, 166 US 226, 17
SCt 581 (1897) .
The

Supreme

governments

Court

has

cities and counties

established

that

local

may be held liable under

42 U.S.C. §1983 if they enact an unconstitutional policy.
See Monell vs Department of Social Services, 43 6 US 658, 98
SCt 2018 (1978). See also Mood for a Day, Incorporated vs
Salt Lake County, 953 F.Supp. 1252 (D.C. Utah 1995); Foote
vs Spiegel, 995 F.Supp. 1347 (D.C. Utah 1998) [holding Davis
County (Utah) liable for Section 1983 liability arising out
of "strip search policy" upon incarceration of pre-trial
detainees].
In the instant

case, it

is absolutely

clear and

undisputed that the COUNTY was relying upon its ORDINANCE,
so as to require the in-kind exaction at

issue! The

ordinance represents the clearest, the most final expression
of COUNTY on the subject. The Ordinance represents the
policy of the County, as expressed by its governing body.
The "color of law" element of the cause of action has been
met.
Is

the

Plaintiff

entitled

to

be

free

of

the

"unconstitutional taking" effected against the Plaintiff by
the Defendant COUNTY? Absolutely yes! Has the Defendant
COUNTY, "under color of law", deprived the Plaintiff of its
constitutional rights? Absolutely.
An award of attorney's

fees to the Plaintiff

is

justified pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1988.
IX
THE COUNTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED TO ASSERT
ITS CLAIMED "EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES"
DUE TO ITS OWN UNUSED OPPORTUNITIES
Defendant claims that Plaintiff's claims fail due to
the claimed failure to "exhaust administrative remedies".
This argument is misplaced for several reasons:
First,

the

Plaintiff

attempted

to

"exhaust

administrative remedies" by appealing to the Salt Lake
County Commission. THE COUNTY COMMISSION REFUSED TO EVEN
HEAR THE APPEAL! [The County Commission didn't hear the
appeal and then decide against the Plaintiff. THE COUNTY
COMMISSION REFUSED TO EVEN HEAR THE APPEAL! The COUNTY
cannot be heard to complain that the Plaintiff failed to
exhaust it administrative remedies when the COUNTY wouldn't

even consider the Plaintiff's claims of "unconstitutional
takings".
Secondly, the "exhaustion of remedies" requirement does
not apply to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. A claimant
is not required to "exhaust state administrative remedies"
prior to bringing a Section 1983 claim. Heck vs Humphrey,
512 US 477, 114 SCt 2364 (1994) . See also Clark vs Yosemite
Community College District, 785 F.2d 781 (9th Circuit 1986);
Fierro vs Gomez, 77 F.3d 301

(9th Circuit 1996), cert

granted, vacated 117 SCt 285.
Thirdly, given the fact that the COUNTY summarily and
unilaterally refused to consider Plaintiff's claims (or a
portion thereof), the COUNTY ought not be heard to complain:
the COUNTY should be estopped from raising this issue as a
"defense". It was the COUNTY in the first instance which
REFUSED TO HEAR THE APPEAL in the first instance!
The "exhaustion of remedies" requirement is excused
when doing so would serve no useful purpose. Here, given the
COUNTY'S unyielding intransigence

even when facing the

Plaintiff's "constitutional violation" claims

to enforce

the COUNTY'S ordinance requiring the dedication, continued
attempts to "exhaust" would have resulted only in the
"exhaustion of the Plaintiff", not in any perceived benefit
to

the

County

or

to

the

Court! The

COUNTY

had

the

development application for months and months: it didn't
change anything. Nothing changed, even after four letters
from Plaintiff's attorney and a face-to-face meeting with
the Developer and with COUNTY officials

(Director Bill

Marsh, Engineer Reed Demman, and County Attorney Jeff
Thorpe)! [See TRANSCRIPT at page 110.] In this same vein,
the COUNTY had the case for over a year (from 1998 until
1999!), when the development was AGAIN re-examined and
finally approved. That's a year WHILE THE LITIGATION VvAS
FILED AND ON-GOING. The County did nothing.
Furthermore, the COUNTY had AN ENTIRE YEAR to consider
the

"constitutional"

and related

ramifications

of its

actions, even AFTER the litigation was filed: the litigation
was filed in August 1998, following the County's initial
rejection and denial of Plaintiff's "constitutional claims".
But it was not until August. 1999

A YEAR LATER

that the

COUNTY finally granted final development approval for the
subject development, albeit with the 3500 South Street
roadway dedication at the 53-foot location. The purpose of
the

"notice

of

claim"

provisions

is

to

alert

the

governmental entity to the existence of the claim and to
provide the government with an opportunity to perhaps remedy
the

situation, before

situation, the COUNTY

it gets worse.

In the

instant

having an entire year to work with

the Developer on the "dedication" issue

consciously and

consistently chose to ignore his "constitutional" (i.e.
"takings") claims.
And lastly, the Plaintiff's "state law" claims for the
unconstitutional "taking" is under Article I, Section 22.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 22
is

"self-executing"

and

that

statutory

prerequisites

purporting to bar or restrict such a constitutional claim

are invalid. See Colman vs State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622
(Utah 1990) [holding Governmental Immunity Act inapplicable
for such "self-executing" constitutional provisions and
issues] . In the same fashion, the provisions of other state
statutes

are

inapplicable

to

restrict

and/or

delay

Plaintiff's "self-executing" constitutional claims for the
payment of "just compensation" for its private property
"taken or damaged for public use". See Hansen vs Salt Lake
County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990) ["Governmental immunity
cannot apply to prohibit suit or recovery under an inverse
condemnation theory. That would be unconstitutional under
the interpretation we have given article I, section 22 in
Colman."] Thus, any

"notice of claim" requirements or

restrictions cannot defeat or limit Plaintiff's "inverse
condemnation" claims herein.
CONCLUSION
The COUNTY'S requirement as to the dedication and full
improvement

of

extraordinarily

the

53-foot

excessive,

roadway

under

"half-width"

terms

of

both

are
state

[Banberry] and federal [Nollan and Dolan] "constitutional"
law. The COUNTY'S requirement contradicts clear legislative
intention

when

it

comes

to

the

improvement

of State

Highways, the improvements of which are to be funded with
State revenues and resources, and not solely by the abutting
propertyowner.
The

COUNTY's

late-created

"individualized

determination" of the impact created by the "Westridge
Meadows" development and its

"reasonable relationship"

("rough proportionality") to those needs fails miserably.
The COUNTY further has failed in its burden to establish
that the required dedications are reasonably "related in
both in nature and extent of the proposed development."
The COUNTY has
statutes

in blatant disregard of two Utah

unconstitutionally required a single property-

owner to bear substantial expenses, which by state statute
are intended to be borne by the public at large. The
COUNTY'S requirements, placing such a burden upon the
"highway-abutting"

developer

while

excusing

similarly-

situated developers from any such requirement denies the
Plaintiff "equal protection of the law" and constitutes a
violation of the "uniform operation of law" provision of the
Utah Constitution.
The COUNTY has consistently claimed its actions were
pursuant

to

ordinances

requiring

the

dedication

and

improvement of the public roadway: the "color of law"
element to the Section 1983 "civil rights claim" has been
admitted. The "constitutional" analysis as to the "excessive
exactions" provides the remainder of the proof for the
"civil rights violation", for which reasonable attorney's
fees should be awarded.
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the
District Court

[incorrectly adjudicating the matter on

"matters of law" issues] and direct the District Court to
enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
County:
1.

Declaring

the

required

dedications

and

exactions to be unconstitutionally "excessive" and
to be in violation of other constitutional and
statutory provisions, as herein described;
2.

Awarding the Plaintiff the reasonable value of

the dedications and improvements, including the
"severance damages" against the remainder parcel
(calculated on the basis of the retail selling
price of the two building lots "lost" by reason of
the excessive dedication);
3.
from

Permanently enjoining the Defendant COUNTY
enforcing

the

said

unconstitutional

provisions of its roadway improvement ordinance
against the Plaintiff and against other similarly
situated persons or entities;
4.

Awarding, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, the

Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees necessarily
incurred in bringing this action.
5.

Awarding such other relief as is appropriate.

Respectfully submitted this 18th day of March, 2002.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 07 THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 07 UTAH

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah :
limited liability company,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 980908157

VS.

•

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the
State of Utah,

:
:

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on April
23 and 24, 2001. Representatives for the plaintiff and defendant
were present and represented by counsel.
opening arguments.

The parties waived

The plaintiff presented its case and rested.

The defendant offered evidence in support of its defenses and the
defendant rested. Following closing arguments on May 21, 2001, the
Court took the matter under advisement.
Since taking the matter under advisement, the Court has
reviewed the exhibits, examined the legal authorities cited by
counsel in support of their respective positions, and considered
the testimony offered during the course of the trial.

The Court

being fully advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision.

EXHIBIT 1
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

frggM* AEA1Y9IS
The plaintiff has presented this Court with a number of issues
concerning the constitutionality of certain " in-kind exact ions,"
which the plaintiff alleges were conditions of its development
approval.

The defendant, however, has pointed out that the scope

of the legal issues properly before this Court are substantially
narrowed by the fact that the plaintiff only appealed the Planning
Commission's increase in ROW requirement from 40 foot half-width
(not 33 feet, as the plaintiff now claims) to 53 foot half-width.
Since the plaintiff's appeal to the County Board of Commissioners
was

limited

to

this

narrow

jurisdiction

to

consider

the

issue,

this

plaintiff's

Court
argument

is

without
that

the

improvements it allegedly was required to make as a condition for
approval are unconstitutional and illegal.

The Court therefore

considers only whether the defendant's required dedication of 53
feet is constitutional and otherwise legal.
The plaintiff contends that this case arises in the special
context of exactions, where the defendant has conditioned the
approval of the plaintiff's proposed development on the dedication
of 53 feet of property for public use. Moreover, the plaintiff's
position is that because the condition requiring the dedication of
53 feet of property is excessive, the Court should apply the

EXHIBIT 1

B.A.M. V.
SALT LAKE COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

"rough-proportionality" test of Dolan v. Citv of Tiaard, 114 S. Ct.
2309 (1994).
In reviewing Dolan and Nolan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 107
S.Ct. 3141 (1987), the Court is not persuaded that these cases
apply to a municipal highway dedication ordinance which requires
dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive
transportation scheme.

To the contrary, these cases apply to a

narrow class of cases where regulatory bodies use their police
power

on

an

extortionate

individual
manner

to

and

discretionary

exact

basis

unconstitutional

approval and issuance of development permits.
highway

ordinance

in

this

case

imposes

and

in

an

conditions

to

In contrast, the

the

requirement

of

dedication on a broad class of property owners who choose to
develop

property

which

abuts

Furthermore, the assessment

a major

or

secondary

highway.

of how much property had

to be

dedicated was not individualized, but rather was made pursuant to
the generally applicable County Transportation Master Plan and
applied across the board to all owners whose property abutted 3500
South. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Dolan analysis is
not applicable to this case.
The Court is similarly unpersuaded by the plaintiffs Equal
Protection and Uniform Operation of Laws arguments.
above, the dedication ordinance

is applied

EXHIBIT 1

As stated

uniformly on all

B.A.M. V.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

developers of highway-abutting land. The plaintiff's argument that
this geography-based approach treats individuals who are similarly
situated differently is simply

incorrect.

For instance, the

developers of Elusive Meadows are not similarly situated because
their land does not abut a highway.

The ordinance clearly cannot

require such a developer to dedicate land which it does not own.
At the same time, the developers of Elusive Meadows do not have the
same economic advantages as the plaintiff because they do not have
the visibility, exposure, etc.

Moreover, the ordinance passes

constitutional muster under the "rational basis'1 standard recently
articulated by the Supreme Court in Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001). As the defendant points
out, there is a "rational basis" for treating owners of highwayabutting property differently in order to effectuate the County's
long-range transportation plan.

For the same reasons, the

plaintiff's "uniform operation of laws" theory fails as a matter of
law.

The Court has reviewed the case of Little America Hotel

Corp. v. Salt Lake City. 785 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1989), and finds that
the highway dedication ordinance complies with the analytical model
set forth in that case.
Finally, the Court concludes that in light of evidence adduced
at the trial, the plaintiff's theory of equitable estoppel fails as
a matter of law. Specifically, the plaintiff could not reasonably
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rely upon the County's "preliminary approval," It is clear after
reviewing

Section

18.12.030

of

the

County

Ordinance

that

"preliminary" approval only gives the developer leeway to "proceed
with preparation of specifications for the minimum improvements .
. . and with the preparation of the final plat."

The plaintiff

could not reasonably rely on this conditional, preliminary approval
in deciding to close the purchase of the pre-subdivision parcel.
Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of
equitable estoppel.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds in favor of the
defendant on all counts. Counsel for the defendant is directed to
prepare the appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
all in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum Decision. Counsel
for the defendant should submit the same to the counsel for the
plaintiff for his review as to form.

Any objections as to form

should be resolved between the parties before the documents are
submitted to the Court. Should there be objections to form of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Orders and Judgments that
cannot be resolved, the objector should file the Objection, in
writing, with the Court so that the Court will have before it the
Objection, the proposed Findings and the Response to the Objection,
if any, so the Court can review the Objection, the Response and the
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proposed Findings and make a determination on any disputed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or fojnn of Order.
Dated this ft day of June,
I OF

?IMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 1 9 2001
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 980908157

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the
State of Utah,
Defendant.

The Court has before it two requests for decision submitted by
counsel for the defendant seeking a decision on two outstanding
Motions submitted by the plaintiff.

The outstanding Motions are

the plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, and the plaintiff's Motion
for Entry of New Findings and/or Additional Findings.

The Court

has reviewed the moving documents submitted by the plaintiff, the
responsive documents filed by the County, and being fully advised,
determines that the plaintiff's Motions are not well taken and
should be denied.
The Court is satisfied that the Motions should be denied for
the reasons set out in the opposition Memorandum filed by Salt Lake
County. Inasmuch as the County has properly articulated the basis
for this Court denying the Motions submitted by the plaintiff,
there is no need to recount those in this Minute Entry ruling.
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Counsel for the defendant should prepare an appropriate Order
showing that the Motions are denied, and submit the same to the
Court for review and signature pursuant to the Code of Judicial
Administration.

r

• \°\
Dated this 1 ( day of September, 2001.

M
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

EXHIBIT 2

